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Abstract
This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception
in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponents strategy. Equilibrium
requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and
optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the
available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic
setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Er-
ror. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is
hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm.
Deception and belief manipulation are key aspects of many strategic interactions, includ-
ing bargaining, poker games, military operations, politics and investment banking. Anec-
dotal evidences of belief manipulation and deception are very numerous, and Michael Lewiss
(1990) best-seller "Liars Poker" reports colorful illustrations of such strategic behaviors in
the world of investment banking in the late 1980s. For example, Lewis explains how "he
spent most of his working life inventing logical lies" that worked amazingly well (thanks
to the logical appearance, see Lewis (1990) page 186). From the viewpoint of game theory,
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belief manipulation and deception are delicate to capture because traditional equilibrium ap-
proaches assume that players fully understand the strategy of their opponents.1 We depart
from this tradition by assuming that players may have a partial rather than total under-
standing of the strategy of their opponents. This in turn allows us to propose an equilibrium
approach to deception, where deception is dened to be the process by which actions are
chosen to manipulate beliefs so as to take advantage of the erroneous inferences.2
To illustrate the phenomenon of deception, we will consider and formalize the following
bargaining situation. The owner of a house, Mrs A, wishes to sell her good at some price
considered to be high (say above the market price as perceived by real estate agents). A
potential buyer, Mr B, comes in. Mr B will accept paying the high price if he is afraid enough
that another buyer may be interested in the house. Otherwise, he will prefer to continue
bargaining in the hope of getting a lower price. The owner, Mrs A, after mentioning some
slight problems with the heating system (thereby conceding a small discount in the price)
tells Mr B that there is another potential buyer, and so she is not willing to discount the
price any further. Mr B has no way to verify Mrs As claims (in a reasonable amount of
time). Should Mr B trust Mrs A when she says that there is another buyer, or is she blu¢ng?
In the theory to be developed below, mentioning that there are heating deciencies will
make it more likely in Mr Bs eyes that Mrs A is an honest seller always telling the truth.
As a result, Mr B will be convinced enough that there is indeed another buyer when Mrs A
says so, and he will accept paying the high price (minus the small discount conceded for the
reported heating deciencies). By mentioning that there are deciencies, Mrs A manipulates
Mr Bs belief about her true nature (whether she is an honest seller or an opportunist), and
she exploits Mr Bs inference error when she says that there is another buyer.
Such a deceptive tactic works in our theory in so far that mentioning small deciencies is
more representative of honest sellers than of opportunist sellers over all transaction situations
(with high or low prices, say), and in forming his judgement about Mrs As type, Mr B
somehow only considers the general attitudes of the various types of sellers and does not
distinguish how the various types of sellers behave in those various transaction situations
1As regards Lewis deceptive tactic, it is not at all clear from a game theoretic perspective why the fact
that the lie is logical (in a given instance) should increase the likelihood that it is believed. If liers always
use logical lies, then logic should even heighten the listeners suspicion.
2From the perspective of this paper, logic may be viewed as more typical of true statements (over all
possible statements), thereby making the use of logical lies more e¤ective.
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with high or low price.
We will present a detailed formalization of the above deceptive bargaining tactic in Sec-
tion II, pointing out that it would not work if Mr B were fully rational.3 Before developing
that application, we present in Section I a general framework that allows us to model quite
generally such inference errors as the one made by Mr B in a game theoretic equilibrium
approach.
Specically, the class of games considered in this paper are two-player multi-stage games
with incomplete information and observable actions in which players may be of several types,
past actions are assumed to be observable by everyone, and types may a¤ect the preference
relations of players. A key non-standard ingredient is that players are also parameterized by
how nely they understand their opponent s strategy. In addition to their preference and
informational characteristics, players are endowed with cognitive types.
Following Jehiel (2005), cognitive types are modelled by assuming that players partition
the decision nodes of their opponents into various sets referred to as analogy classes, and that
players understand only the aggregate behavior of their opponent over the various decision
nodes forming their analogy classes. Cognitive types are further di¤erentiated according to
whether or not the player distinguishes the behaviors of the various types of his opponent.
Thus, cognitive types may vary in two dimensions: a player may be more or less ne in
the partition of the decision nodes of his opponent (what we call the analogy part), and a
player may or may not distinguish the behaviors of the various types of his opponent (the
sophistication part). In the above bargaining story, Mr B bundles the announcement nodes
of sellers into one analogy class, whether the price is high or low, and he distinguishes the
behaviors of honest and opportunist sellers. Thus, Mr B uses a coarse analogy partition, but
he is sophisticated in the terminology just dened.
Given a strategic environment that includes the specication of players cognitive types,
we dene an equilibrium concept that we refer to as the analogy-based sequential equilib-
rium. In equilibrium, players have correct expectations about the aggregate behavior of their
opponents in their various analogy classes - these are referred to as analogy-based expecta-
tions. Whenever they move, players play best-responses to their analogy-based expectations
3Indeed, if Mr B were fully rational, he should understand that opportunist sellers more systematically
concede that there are small deciencies when the price is high, and thus Mr B should be even more cautious
about the true presence of another buyer when told that there are heating problems.
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and to their belief about the type of their opponent. As the game proceeds, players update
their beliefs about the type of their opponent according to Bayes rule as derived from their
analogy-based expectations.4
In Section I we show that in nite environments (nite numbers of types, actions, and
nodes), an analogy-based sequential equilibrium always exists. We also suggest how to inter-
pret the solution concept from a learning perspective. Finally, we illustrate the working of
the concept in a simple two-person two-period zero-sum game in which the payo¤ structure
is commonly known to players but players may have cognitive types other than the fully
rational one. The example serves to illustrate 1) why a player with non-fully rational cog-
nitive ability cannot be viewed as a rational player who does not distinguish between some
situations (a player with coarser information), 2) how, in a mixed population of rational
and coarse players, a rational player always performs better, and 3) why, in our framework
with incorrect inferences, there may be room for reputation building even in zero-sum games
where there is no value to commitment.5
The framework of Section I is then used in Section II to formalize the above deceptive
bargaining tactic. Section III concludes. We shall start, however, by situating our work in
the perspective of various literatures.
Related literature
There have been many attempts to relax the rationality assumptions imposed on economic
agents. These include relaxing the ability of agents to optimize their strategy given their
beliefs (as in the Quantal Response Equilibrium, Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey,
1995) or relaxing the ability of agents to form correct expectations. By maintaining the
ability of agents to optimize their strategies given their beliefs, our paper contributes to the
second form of departure from rationality, which we refer to as cognitive limitations.
4More precisely, we assume that players adopt the simplest representation of their opponents strategy
that is consistent with their knowledge (the analogy-based expectation). That is, the opponents behavior in
the various nodes bundled into one analogy class is assumed to be the same and in equilibrium it coincides
with the aggregate distribution of the opponents behavior over the set of nodes forming the analogy class.
The evolution of the belief system is then similar to that in sequential equilibrium (David Kreps and Robert
Wilson (1982a)) except that it is based on the conjecture about the opponents strategy as just dened
(rather than on the opponents true strategy).
5The traditional approach to reputation pioneered by Thomas Schelling (1960) associates the idea of
successful reputation building with the successful ability to commit to a particular behavior (which is of no
use in a zero-sum game, due to the minmax theorem).
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Several routes have been pursued to model cognitive limitations either introducing explicit
biases in the inference process (see Daniel Khaneman et al., 1982 for an exposition of such
biases as the gamblers fallacy, the base rate neglect, the conjunction fallacy etc...) or
deriving the expectations from limited introspective reasoning (as in the level k approach,
Dale Stahl, 1993) or deriving the expectations and inference process from the erroneous or
coarse perception held by agents about their environment (approaches based on subjective
prior or the self-conrming equilibrium and this paper, respectively). Our paper contributes
to the last of these routes by further postulating that the coarse perception held by boundedly
rational agents is the simplest representation -or model of others- that is consistent with their
coarse statistical knowledge.
Such a line of research that views bounded rationality equilibrium concepts as a result of
partial learning is the common theme of the limited foresight equilibrium (Jehiel, 1995), the
analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) and the valuation equilibrium (Jehiel
and Samet, 2007).6 Jehiel (2005) developed the analogy-based equilibrium concept to capture
bounds on rationality that accommodate coarse perception but fully rational information
processing, and extended to static games of incomplete information in Jehiel and Frederic
Koessler (2008). Our aim in this paper is to extend this basic structure to extensive games
with incomplete information, which is necessary to analyze the evolution of beliefs over
time. The extension of these concepts to dynamic games allows us to examine the basic
ideas of belief manipulation and deception. Connected to the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium, Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin (2005) have proposed a concept for static
games of incomplete information, called cursed equilibrium, in which players do not fully
take into account how other peoples actions depend on their information.7 In problems
with interdependent preferences, the cursed equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin gives rise to
erroneous equilibrium beliefs (as the analogy-based expectation equilibrium does) about the
relation between the strategy and the signal of the opponent. Yet, by the very static nature
6Other approaches based on the idea that to facilitate learning agents do not consider the set of all possible
strategies but only a subset are also available, see in particular Olivier Compte and Andrew Postlewaite
(2008).
7The cursed equilibrium was developed independently of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium. The
fully cursed equilibrium can be viewed as a special case of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium in which
players analogy partitions coincide with their own information partitions. The partially cursed equilibrium
can be viewed as an alternative approach to the idea of partial sophistication to that captured by the
analogy-based expectation equilibrium (see Jehiel and Koessler (2008) for further discussion).
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of the games considered by Eyster and Rabin, no belief manipulation can be captured by
their approach, which constitutes a key di¤erence from the present framework.
Even though the starting point of our approach is about modeling the consequences of
the coarse perception of agents with cognitive limitations as just explained, it turns out
that our paper can also be viewed as formalizing a well studied bias in social psychology,
e.g., the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) (see Edward Jones and Keith Davis (1965),
Lee Ross (1977), Ross, Teresa Amabile and Julia Steinmetz (1977)). Roughly speaking, the
FAE is "the tendency in forming one owns judgement about others to underestimate the
importance of the specic situation in which the observed behavior is occurring" (Maureen
O Sullivan (2003)).8 In the above bargaining story, Mr B is subject to the FAE. In forming
his judgement about whether he is facing an honest seller after Mrs A has reported minor
heating deciencies, Mr B "ignores" that sellers attitudes are not the same whether the
price is high or low. Our model provides an explicit way to formalize such a neglect by Mr
B.
There have been several earlier game theoretic attempts to capture the phenomenon of
deception. These include the ideas of playing mixed strategy (to avoid being detected) in
zero-sum interactions (John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern (1944)) and of playing
a pooling or semi-pooling equilibrium (thereby not revealing ones own type) in signaling
games (Michael Spence (1973)) or communication games (Joel Sobel (1985) and Vincent
Crawford (2003)) or repeated games (Kreps and Wilson (1982b), Kreps et al. (1982), Drew
Fudenberg and David Levine (1989)). Our approach to deception di¤ers from these earlier
approaches in that it is based on the idea of belief manipulation (by which we mean that
some players end up having erroneous beliefs based on their observation), which cannot arise
in the standard rationality paradigm considered in these earlier approaches. In our theory,
deception can be viewed as the exploitation by rational players of the FAE made by other
8Ross et al. (1977) report a striking example in support of the FAE. In a pool of Stanford students from
various elds, subjects were divided between questioners and answerers. The "questioners" were requested
to ask the answerers di¢cult questions. Every questioner was matched to a single answerer who was almost
always from a di¤erent eld. After the quizz (answerers and questioners then knew how many correct
answers were given in their match), it was observed that answerers consistently thought they were worse
than questioners, thereby ignoring the fact that the pool of questions on which they performed relatively
poorly was not generated at random but drawn from the esoteric knowledge of the questioner. Note that
answerers were explicitly told before the quizz that questioners could freely choose the questions they liked
best.
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players, where FAE allows for belief manipulation.
Finally, it should be mentioned that our setup can be used to formalize a model of persua-
sion in the vein of the one developed independently of this paper by Sendhil Mullainathan et
al. (2008), in which a persuader nds it advantageous to send (costly) messages even when
they are not informative.9
I. A General Framework
A. The class of games and the cognitive environment
We consider multi-stage two-player games with observed actions and incomplete inform-
ation. Extension to more than two players raises no conceptual di¢culties. Each player
i = 1; 2 can be one of nitely many types i 2 i. Player i knows his own type i, but
not that of player j, j 6= i. We assume that the distribution of types is independent across
players, and we let pi > 0 denote the prior probability that player i is of type i. These
prior probabilities pi = (pi)i are assumed to be known to the players. Players observe past
actions and earlier moves by nature except for the choice of their opponents type. Moreover,
there is a nite number of stages, and, at every stage and for every player including nature,
the set of pure actions is nite.
Player i plays at the same set Hi of histories, whatever his type i.
10 Moreover, the
action space of player i at history h 2 Hi is common to all types i, and is denoted by Ai(h).
The set of all histories is denoted by H and the set of terminal histories is denoted by
Z. The set of players who must move at history h is denoted by I(h), and ha is the history
starting with h and followed by a where a 2 
i2I(h)
Ai(h) is the action prole played by the
players who must move at h.
Each player i is endowed with a VNM utility function dened on lotteries over terminal
histories h 2 Z. Player is VNM utility is denoted by ui and it may depend on the types of
9In their model, such an application requires nature in state s = 1 (or 2) to be identied with the strategic
persuader in state s = 0. It also requires to assume that the listener pools the message moves in state s = 1
(or 2) and s = 0 into one analogy class (while distinguishing the persuaders behavior according to her private
information). The analogy-based sequential equilibrium thus obtained corresponds to the more "Bayesian"
approach they present in appendix II, thereby providing a learning justication to that approach rather than
to the simpler one pursued in the body of their paper.
10A history refers to the earlier moves made by the players and possibly the earlier moves made by
nature except for the choice of players types which is not included in the history. Given our observability
assumptions, histories are commonly known to the players.
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players i and j together with the terminal history. That is, ui(h; i; j) is player is payo¤ if
the terminal history h 2 Z is reached, and players i and j are of type i and j, respectively.
Each player i is assumed to know his own payo¤ structure (but not a priori that of his
opponent).
The non-standard aspect of our strategic environment   lies in the denition of the types
i. Types i are made of two components i = (ti; ci) where ti is the preference type of player
i that acts on players preferences - this is the standard component in the type - and ci is
the cognitive type of player i, dening how nely player i understands the strategy of player
j - this is the non-standard component in the type.
As common sense suggests, the cognitive type of players do not a¤ect players preferences
over the various terminal nodes. That is, for every terminal history h 2 Z, we have that
ui(h; i; j) = ui(h; 
0
i; 
0
j) whenever i and 
0
i have the same preference type ti, and j and
0j have the same preference type tj.
Cognitive types ci are dened as follows. Each player i forms an expectation about the
behavior of player j by pooling together several histories h 2 Hj at which player j must
move, and each such pool is referred to as a class of analogy. Players are also di¤erentiated
according to whether or not they distinguish between the behaviors of the various types of
their opponent.
Formally, a cognitive type ci of player i is characterized by (Ani; i), where Ani stands
for player is analogy partition and i is a dummy variable that species whether or not type
i distinguishes between the behaviors of the various types j of player j. We let i = 1
when type i distinguishes between types js behaviors and i = 0 otherwise. As in Jehiel
(2005), Ani is dened as a partition of the set Hj of histories at which player j must move
into subsets or analogy classes i.
11 When h and h0 are in the same analogy class i, it
is required that Aj(h) = Aj(h
0). That is, at two histories h and h0 which player i pools
together, the action space of player j should be the same, and A(i) denotes the common
action space in i.
11A partition of a set X is a collection of subsets xk  X such that
S
k
xk = X and xk \xk0 = ; for k 6= k
0.
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B. Analogy-based sequential equilibrium
Analogy-based expectations:
An analogy-based expectation for player i of type i is denoted by i. It species, for
every analogy class i of player i of type i, a probability measure over the action space
A(i) of player j. Types j of player j are distinguished or not by player i according to
whether i = 1 or 0. If i = 1, i is a function of j and i, and i(j; i) is player is
expectation about the average behavior of player j with type j in class i. If i = 0, player
i merges the behaviors of all types j of player j, and i is a sole function of i: i(i)
is then player is expectation about the average behavior of player j in class i (where the
average is taken over all possible types).12 We let i = (i)i2i denote the analogy-based
expectation of player i for the various possible types i 2 i.
Strategy:
A behavioral strategy of player i is denoted by si. It is a mapping that assigns to every
history h 2 Hi at which player i must move a distribution over player is action space
Ai(h).
13 We let i denote the behavioral strategy of type i, and for every h 2 Hi we let
i(h) 2 Ai(h) denote the distribution over Ai(h) according to which player i of type i
selects actions in Ai(h) when at h. We let i(h)[ai] be the corresponding probability that
type i plays ai 2 Ai(h) when at h, and we let i = (i)i denote the strategy of player i
for the various possible types i;  will denote the strategy prole of the two players.
Belief system:
When player i distinguishes the types of player j, i.e. i = 1, he holds a belief about
the type of his opponent and this belief may typically change as time proceeds (and new
observations become available). Formally, we let i denote the belief system of player i
of type i, where i(h)[j] is the probability that player i of type i assigns to the event
player j is of type j conditional on the history h being realized.
When player i does not distinguish the types of player j, no belief system is required. To
12We could more generally allow players to distinguish partially the types. This would lead to a partitional
approach dening which of the types are being confused. The resulting presentation would however be more
cumbersome without bringing additional insights.
13Mixed strategies and behavioral strategies are equivalent, since we consider games of perfect recall.
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save on notation, we assume that in this case player i s belief coincides with the prior pj
throughout the game. We call i the belief system of player i for the various possible types
i, and we let  be the prole of belief systems for the two players i = 1; 2.
Sequential rationality:
From his analogy-based expectation i, player i of type i derives the following repres-
entation of player js strategy: Player i perceives player j to play at every history h 2 i
according to the average behavior in class i.
14 The induced strategy depends on the type
j of player j whenever i = 1 but not when i = 0. At every history h 2 Hi where he must
play, player i is assumed to play a best-response to this perceived strategy of player j as
weighted by his belief i(h).
Formally, we dene the i-perceived strategy of player j, 
i
j , as
If i = 1 
i
j
(h) = i(j; i) for every h 2 i and j 2 j
If i = 0 
i
j
(h) = i(i) for every h 2 i and j 2 j
Given the strategy si of player i and given history h, we let si jh denote the continuation
strategy of player i induced by si from history h onwards. We also let u
h
i (si jh; sj jh; i; j)
denote the expected payo¤ obtained by player i when history h has been realized, the types
of players i and j are given by i and j respectively, and players i and j behave according
to si and sj respectively.
Denition 1 (Criterion) Player is strategy i is a sequential best-response to (i; i) if and
only if for all i 2 i, for all strategies si and all histories h 2 Hi,
X
j2j
i(h)[j]u
h
i (i jh; 
i
j
jh; i; j) 
X
j2j
i(h)[j]u
h
i (si jh; 
i
j
jh; i; j):
Consistency:
In equilibrium, two notions of consistency are required. First, analogy-based expectations
14This is the simplest representation compatible with type is knowledge.
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are required to be consistent with the strategy prole. That is, they must coincide with
the real average behaviors in every considered class and for every possible type (if types are
di¤erentiated), where the weight given to each element of an analogy class must itself be
consistent with the real probability of visiting this element. A learning interpretation of this
consistency requirement will be suggested. Second, the belief system held by players must
be consistent with their expectations, as in Sequential Equilibrium.
Formally, letting P (i; j; h) denote the probability that history h is reached when play-
ers i and j are of types i and j respectively, and players play according to , the consistency
of the analogy-based expectations is dened as:
Denition 2 Player is analogy-based expectation i is consistent with the strategy prole
 if and only if:
 For any (i; j) 2  such that i = 1, and for all i 2 Ani,
i(j; i) =
P
(0i;h)2ii
p0iP
(0i; j; h)  j(h)P
(0i;h)2ii
p0iP
(0i; j; h)
whenever there exist 0i and h 2 i such that P
(0i; j; h) > 0:
 For any i 2  such that i = 0, and for all i 2 Ani,
i(i) =
P
(0i;
0
j ;h)2i
p0ip0jP
(0i; 
0
j; h)  0j(h)P
(0i;
0
j ;h)2i
p0ip0jP
(0i; 
0
j; h)
whenever there exist 0i, 
0
j and h 2 i such that P
(0i; 
0
j; h) > 0.
The consistency of the belief system is dened as:
Denition 3 Player is belief system i is consistent with the analogy-based expectation i
if and only if for any (i; j) 2  such that i = 1
i(j)(;) = pj :
11
And for all histories h, ha
i(ha)[j] = i(h)[j] whenever h =2 Hj
i(j)(ha) =
i(h)[j]
i
j
(h)[aj]P
0j2j
i(h)[
0
j]
i
0j
(h)[aj]
whenever h 2 Hj, there exists 
0
j s.t. 
i
0j
(h)[aj] > 0 and player j plays aj at h:
While the consistency of the analogy-based expectations (denition 2) should be thought
of as the limiting outcome of a learning process, the consistency of the belief system i
(denition 3) should be thought of as an expression of player i s inference process. Based
on his representation of the strategy of the various types of his opponent, player i makes
inferences using Bayes law as to the likelihood of the various possible types he is facing.
The learning process we have in mind to justify the correctness of the analogy-based
expectations involves populations of players i and j in which there is a constant share pi
of players of type i. In each round, players i and j are randomly matched. At the end of
a round, the behaviors of the matched players and their types are revealed. These players
exit the population, and they are replaced by new players with the same type.15 All pieces
of information are gathered in a general data set, and players have di¤erent access to this
data set depending on their types.16 At each round of the learning process, players choose
their strategy as a best-response to the feedback they received (and the system of belief
that derives from it), which in turn generates new data for the next round. If the pattern of
behaviors adopted by the players stabilizes to some strategy prole , every players analogy-
based expectations should eventually converge to the ones that are consistent with  given
his cognitive type,17 which motivates the solution concept dened below.
15The replacement scenario is reminiscent of the recurring game framework studied by Matthew Jackson
and Ehud Kalai (1997), who assume that each individual player only plays once. This is to be contrasted
with a recent paper by Ignacio Esponda (2008), who, in static games of incomplete information, elaborates
on Eyster-Rabins fully cursed equilibrium by assuming that players i have access both to the empirical
distribution of actions of players j (but not to how these actions are related to js private information) and
to is own distribution of payo¤s.
16A player i with cognitive type ci = (Ani; i) such that i = 0 has access to the average empirical
distribution of behavior in every analogy class i 2 Ani where the average is taken over all histories h 2 i
and over the entire population of players j. A player with cognitive type ci = (Ani; i) such that i = 1 has
access to the average empirical distribution of behavior in every i 2 Ani for each subpopulation of types
j of players j.
17Observe that the average in the expression of i(j ; i) is taken over all possible realizations of player
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Equilibrium:
In equilibrium, both the analogy-based expectations and the belief systems are consistent,
and players play best-responses to their analogy-based expectations at every history. In
line with the Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982a)), we require the analogy-
based expectations and belief systems to be consistent with respect to slight totally mixed
perturbations of the strategy prole where a totally mixed strategy for player i is a strategy
that assigns strictly positive probability to every action ai 2 Ai(h) at every history h 2 Hi.
This in turn puts additional structure on the expectations and beliefs at histories that
belong to analogy classes that are never reached in equilibrium.18
Denition 4 A strategy prole  is an Analogy-based Sequential Equilibrium if and only if
there exist analogy-based expectations i, belief systems i for i = 1; 2; and sequences (
k)k,
(ki )k , (
k
i )k converging to , , , respectively, such that each 
k is a totally mixed strategy
prole, and for every i and k:
1. i is a sequential best-response to (i; i)
2. ki is consistent with 
k and
3. ki is consistent with 
k
i .
Compared to the sequential equilibrium, the main novelty lies in the introduction of cog-
nitive types who may only know partial aspects of the strategy of their opponent. Compared
to the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)), the main novelty lies in the
introduction of players uncertainty about the type of their opponent and the possibility that
a cognitive type may distinguish the behaviors of the various types of his opponent. It is
the combination of these features that allows us to speak of deception as the exploitation
of the FAE. More precisely, such a deception requires the presence of players who are both
uncertain about their opponents type (so that there is room for inference processes) and
is types 0i, hence the summation over 
0
i . That is, we are assuming that player i of type i is informed of
j s behaviors whatever the type of player i they are matched with. The weight p0
i
P(0i; j ; h) on j (h)
simply reects the relative frequency with which j (h) contributes to the aggregate behavior.
18For those readers who dislike trembles, one can o¤er a weaker notion of equilibrium without trembles,
similar in spirit to the self-conrming equilibrium (see Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (1998)). Note,
however, that trembles have less bite in our setup than in the standard framework because for an analogy
class to be reached with positive probability it is enough that one of the histories in the analogy class is
reached with positive probability - a requirement that is weaker when the analogy class is larger.
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are partially knowledgeable of the strategy of their opponent, so that the inferences may be
erroneous.
C. Basic properties
We note that in nite environments, an equilibrium always exists, no matter how cognitive
types are specied and distributed.
Proposition 1 In nite environments, there always exists at least one Analogy-based Se-
quential Equilibrium.
Proof: The proof follows standard methods, rst noting the existence of equilibria in
which each player i is constrained to play any action ai 2 Ai(h) at any history h 2 Hi with
a probability no less than ", and then showing that the limit as " tends to 0 of such strategy
proles is an Analogy-based Sequential Equilibrium. Q. E. D.
We next observe that if every player i is rational (in the sense that for all types i = (ti; ci)
of player i, the cognitive type ci = (Ani; i) is such that Ani is the nest analogy partitionS
h2Hj
fhg, and player i distinguishes between player js types, i = 1), then an analogy-based
sequential equilibrium coincides with a sequential equilibrium of the game in which every
type i = (ti; ci) of player i is identied with her preference type ti. Thus, our framework
can be viewed as providing a generalization of the sequential equilibrium that allows us to
cope with situations in which the cognitive abilities of players need not be perfect.
D. A simple illustration
In this part, we construct an analogy-based sequential equilibrium in a simple two-person
two-period zero-sum game. This example serves to illustrate the working of the concept in
a simple scenario. Specically, consider the two-period-repetition of the following zero-sum
stage game G. In stage game G the Row player chooses an action U or D, the Column
player chooses an action L or R, and stage game payo¤s are as represented in Figure 4. The
overall payo¤ obtained by the players is the sum of the payo¤s obtained in the two periods.
That is, there is no discount between period 1 and period 2 payo¤s.
14
L R
U 5, -5 3, -3
D 0, 0 7, -7
Figure 4. The stage game G
We assume that there are two types of Row players, the Rational type and the Coarse
type, where both types are assumed to be equally likely. The Rational Row player has a
perfect understanding of the strategy of the Column player, as in the standard case. The
Coarse Row player only knows the average behavioral strategy of the Column player over
the two time periods (i.e., he bundles period 1 and the possible histories in period 2 into one
analogy class).
There is one type for the Column player. The Column player is Sophisticated in the sense
that he distinguishes between the behaviors of the Rational Row player and the Coarse Row
player. But, he is assumed to be Coarse in the sense that for each type of the Row player
he only knows the average behavior of this type over the two time periods, i.e. he bundles
all histories into one analogy class.
Proposition 2 The following strategy prole is an Analogy-based Expectation Sequential
Equilibrium. 1) Rational Row Player: Play U in period 1. Play D in period 2 if U was
played in period 1, and U otherwise. 2) Coarse Row Player: Play U both in periods 1 and
2. 3) Column Player (Sophisticated Coarse): Play L in period 1. Play R in period 2 if the
Row player played U in period 1. Play L in period 2 if the Row player played D in period 1.
In equilibrium, (U;L) is played in period 1 and then (D;R) in period 2 whenever the
Row player is rational, and (U;L) is played in period 1 and then (U;R) in period 2 whenever
the Row player is coarse. The Column player gets an expected payo¤ of  10 that is less
than her value  70=9. The Rational Row player gets an overall payo¤ of 5+7 = 12 and the
Coarse Row player gets an overall payo¤ of 5 + 3 = 8.
A key aspect of this equilibrium involves understanding the inference process of the
Sophisticated Coarse Column player. The Coarse Row player always plays U , and the
Rational Row player plays U and D with an equal frequency on average. These (average)
behaviors of the two types of Row players dene the analogy-based expectations of the
15
Column player. Given these expectations, the Column player updates her belief about the
type of the Row player as follows: when action D is being played in period 1, the Column
player believes that she faces the Rational Row player for sure. When action U is being
played in period 1, the Column player believes that she faces the Coarse Row player with
probability 1=2
1=2+1=21=2
= 2
3
. Accordingly, the Column player plays R in period 2 because
given her belief, this looks like the smartest decision, even though in reality it is not. Thus,
by playing U in period 1, the Rational Row player builds a false reputation for being more
likely to be a Coarse Row player, which he later exploits in period 2 by getting the high
payo¤ of 7.19
We make several comments about the equilibrium shown in Proposition 2.
First, the Column player gets an expected payo¤ that is less than her value,  70=9, even
though, by the very property of the value, the Column player could very well guarantee
 70=9 - no matter what the Row player does - by playing the maximin strategy (i.e., play
L with probability 4=9 and R with probability 5=9 in both periods). The Column player
chooses not to follow the maximin strategy because she thinks that she can do better, given
her understanding of the strategy of Row players. Such a feature would, of course, not
arise in a standard rationality framework in which the Column player should obtain, in
equilibrium, at least what she can secure irrespective of other players strategies. This helps
to clarify the di¤erence from Vincent Crawford (2003), who assumes in a zero-sum pre-play
communication game that those agents whose behaviors are not exogenously specied are
fully rational and are thus bound to get at least their value in equilibrium.20 It also helps
to explain why it is not possible to interpret the analogy-based sequential equilibrium as a
sequential equilibrium that would obtain in the full rationality paradigm under alternative
informational assumptions.21
19The rest of the argument to establish Proposition 2 goes as follows. It is readily veried that the Rational
Row player plays a best-response to the Column players strategy. (He gets an overall payo¤ of 5 + 7 = 12
and would only get an overall payo¤ of 0 + 11=2 at best if he were to play D in period 1, and he would
obviously get a lower payo¤ by playing U in period 2.) The Coarse Row player nds it optimal to play U
whenever he has to move, because he perceives the Column Player to play L and R with an equal frequency
on average over the two time periods, and 12 (5 + 3) >
1
2 (0 + 7).
20Vincent Crawford (2003) captures the idea of lying for strategic advantage in a zero-sum pre-play com-
munication game that is populated by su¢ciently many mechanical types. But in Crawfords model, the
belief of rational players cannot be manipulated, as equilibrium requires that rational players are not mis-
taken about either the distribution of types or about their strategies. This is a key di¤erence from our
approach.
21Even if the Column player were assumed not to remember whether she is in stage 1 or 2, she could still
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Second, in the equilibrium of Proposition 2, the Rational Row player obtains a larger
payo¤ than the Coarse Row player. This is no coincidence, as the Rational Row player
always has the option to mimic other types strategies and Rational players assess correctly
the payo¤ attached to any strategy.
Finally, it should be noted that it would be impossible to reproduce the behavioral
strategies described in Proposition 2 if there were only one type for each player, who would
be characterized solely by his analogy partition as in Jehiel (2005).22
II. Deception as a Bargaining Tactic
A. The basic setup
The owner of a house, Mrs A, wishes to sell her good. The initial price has already been
publicly announced. It is either p or p where p > p and p may be thought of as being the
"market price" of the house as perceived by real estate agents.
A potential buyer, Mr B, comes in, and the following interaction between Mrs A and
Mr B takes place. Mrs A tells Mr B whether or not some small repairs (say for heating
deciencies) are needed in the house.23 If minor deciencies are announced, the price drops
by an amount . That is, the new price is p  where p was the originally announced price
( should be thought of as being small relative to p p). Then Mrs A tells Mr B whether or
not there is another buyer who has expressed interest in the house. When the initial price
was p = p and Mrs A says that another buyer has expressed interest, the price increases by
a very small amount, say ". No such price increase occurs when the initial price is p = p.24
Only Mrs A knows whether indeed there are small repairs needed and whether there is
another potential buyer. After the announcements are made, Mr B has to decide whether
or not to accept the o¤er (before he can verify the correctness of Mrs As announcements).
secure the value, given that the maxmin strategy does not require any recall (it is stationary). See Jehiel
(2005) and Jehiel and Koessler (2008) for further examples illustrating why the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium cannot be interpreted as a standard equilibrium of a di¤erent game with modied information
structure.
22For the Column player to play a di¤erent action in periods 1 and 2, she should either be indi¤erent
between playing L or R (which cannot be the case here, since the Row player does not play U with probability
7=9 on average) or treat separately the behavior of the Row in the two time periods, but then in period 1
she could not nd it optimal to play L given that the Row player always plays U .
23It is assumed that Mr B cannot verify the nature of these repairs within a reasonable amount of time.
24We assume this only for plausibility. The analysis is una¤ected if we assume that there is also a price
increase when p = p (this is because " is assumed to be small in comparison with p  p).
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If Mr B says yes, the transaction takes place at the agreed price (i.e., p if no deciencies
were announced and p    if deciencies were announced). We let V yesB denote Mr B s
payo¤ when the original price was p and deciencies were announced (so that the nal price
is p ).
If Mr B says no, there are several cases. When the original price was the "market price"
p, no transaction takes place between Mrs A and Mr B, as we assume that Mrs A expects to
sell her house at a price close to p and Mr B expects to buy a similar house at a price close
to p (both Mrs A and Mr B would be slightly better o¤ making the transaction now even at
prices p , p+ ", respectively, due to extra delays imposed by the transaction not being
made now).
When the original price was p and there is e¤ectively another buyer, no transaction
between Mrs A and Mr B takes place. Mrs A gets a payo¤ that is less than p, due to the
risk that the other buyer does not conrm his interest, but signicantly larger than p, and
Mr B gets a payo¤ of V outB (corresponding to the outcome of a search for another house).
When the original price was p and there is no other buyer,25 bargaining between Mrs A
and Mr B goes on. We do not model this extra piece of bargaining explicitly, but we assume
that a transaction eventually takes place at a price signicantly lower than p   (say not
too far from p).26 We denote by V noB the payo¤ obtained by Mr B in this case.
27
On top of the above specications, we assume that there are two categories of sellers, those
who always tell the truth (whom we call honest sellers) and those who do what serves their
interest best (whom we call opportunists). Mrs A can belong to either of these categories,
but there is no way for Mr B to know which, except by making inferences from how she
behaves (here, what she says in the announcement stage).
Finally, we describe the probabilities of the various events, which are assumed to be
known to both Mrs A and Mr B. We assume that the probability of the seller being honest is
 = Pr(Mrs A is honest) independently of the other random variables. We assume that the
probability of a deciency is d = Pr(deciency) independently of the other random variables.
For plausibility reasons, we allow the probabilities that the price is p and that there is
25Presumably Mr B gets further signals (not under Mrs A s control) about this.
26This may be because Mr B values this specic house more than the average buyer and everyone is aware
of this at this bargaining stage.
27More precisely, V noB will denote Mr Bs payo¤ assuming a deciency has been announced.
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another buyer to be (presumably negatively) correlated. We let b = Pr(other buyer) be the
probability that there is another buyer,  = Pr(p = p jother buyer) and  = Pr(p = p jno
other buyer) be the probabilities that the initial price is p conditional on having another
buyer or not having one, respectively. We also let  = b
+(1 b)
 = Pr(p = p) denote
the unconditional probability that the initial price is p.
B. Cognitive environment
In this bargaining problem, a key strategic aspect is the judgement Mr B makes as to the
likelihood that there is another buyer as a function of the announcements made by Mrs A.
When Mr B is told that there is another buyer, should Mr B trust Mrs A? And how is Mr Bs
judgement a¤ected by the announcement (or the non-announcement) of minor deciencies?
We wish to analyze a situation in which Mr B somehow confuses the two price scenarios
p = p; p when assessing the announcement strategies of sellers such as Mrs A (whereas
he distinguishes the strategies of sellers in all other respects). We will also assume that
opportunist sellers are fully rational, and we will show howMrs A, when opportunist, deceives
Mr B by mentioning minor deciencies (whether or not there are any) so as to increase his
belief that there is indeed another buyer when she says there is. From the viewpoint of
social psychology, Mr B is victim of the fundamental attribution error, and when she is
opportunist, Mrs A exploits this. This is the essence of the deceptive tactic that we wish to
highlight here. We will also illustrate later on how deception would be unsuccessful if Mr B
were assumed to be fully rational instead.
To cast the above strategic environment into the framework of Section I, we let tA be
the preference type of Mrs A, where tA = ( ; d; b),  = h, o indicates whether A is honest
or opportunist, d = 1; 0 indicates whether there are (minor) deciencies or not and b = 1; 0
indicates whether there is another buyer or not. Mrs A is assumed to be fully rational. Thus,
her cognitive type corresponds to the standard situation in which every decision node of Mr
B constitutes a singleton analogy class (since there is only one type of Mr B - see below - no
distinction of the various types of Mr B is relevant here). We will identify Mrs As type A
with her preference type tA.
Mr B can only be of one type. While his preferences have already been described, his
cognitive type is described as follows. Mr B puts the "deciency announcement nodes" of
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Mrs A in the same analogy class, whether p = p or p. Similarly, he puts the "other buyer
announcement nodes" of Mrs A in the same analogy class, whether p = p or p. In addition,
he di¤erentiates between the behaviors of the various types of sellers (i.e., B = 1 in the
language of Section I).
Finally, before the interaction between Mrs A and Mr B starts, Nature chooses the type
A of Mrs A and then the initial price p = p; p according to the distribution described above.
C. Analysis
When Mrs A is honest, her strategy is imposed by the denition of her type. She always
tells the truth. That is, she mentions the deciency if there is one and she mentions the
existence of another buyer if there is one, whether the price is p = p or p. Moreover, when
the price is p = p and Mrs A is opportunist, she never mentions any deciency (whether or
not there is one), so as to save on the discount , and she always says that there is another
buyer (whether or not there is one), so as to get the extra " in the nal price.28 Transaction
always takes place between Mrs A and Mr B when p = p.
It only remains to determine the announcement strategy of Mrs A when she is opportunist
and the price is p, and also the acceptance strategy of Mr B in this case.
We will test when the following strategies constitute an analogy-based sequential equilib-
rium. When she is opportunist and the price is p = p, Mrs A always reports that there are
deciencies and that there is another buyer, no matter what the truth is. Mr B says "yes"
to the o¤er after such announcements and "no" after any other announcement (i.e., when
Mrs A says that there is no other buyer, or that there is another buyer and no deciencies
in the house).
A key variable in the analysis is the belief that Mr B attaches to the existence of another
buyer after Mrs A has made her announcements (and the initial price was p = p). Call 
such a belief. Given the above denitions of V outB , V
no
B and V
yes
B , Mr B would accept the deal
(after d = 1 and b = 1 were announced) if V outB + (1   )V
no
B < V
yes
B , and he would reject
it otherwise. Accordingly, we let
 =
V noB   V
yes
B
V noB   V
out
B
28Mrs A knows that the transaction will be approved by Mr B in any event, even if the nal price is p+ "
(rather than p  or p).
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denote the threshold belief such that Mr B would say "yes" if  >  and "no" if  < .
Assuming Mrs A follows the above strategy and given Mr Bs cognitive type, the con-
sistency of Mr Bs analogy-based expectations implies that he should expect honest sellers
to always report the truth, and opportunist sellers either to say that d = 1 and b = 1 with
probability  = Pr(p = p) or to say that d = 0 and b = 1 with probability 1  , independ-
ently of p, d, b. From such a perception, the distribution of (p; d; b), and Bayes law, one can
now compute Mr Bs posterior belief denoted post( = h) that Mrs A is honest when she
says that d = 1, b = 1 and p = p.
post( = h) =
db

db
 + (1  )()2
This follows from noting that Mr Bs perceived probability that ( = h and p = p, Mrs
A says d = 1, b = 1) is db
 and Mr Bs perceived probability that ( = o and p = p,
Mrs A says d = 1, b = 1) is (1  )()2.29
After observing that p = p and hearing that d = 1 and b = 1 from Mrs A, Mr B assesses
the probability that there is another buyer based on his prior belief that Mrs A is honest
and his perceived informativeness of As messages whether  = h or o. Since Mr B knows
that when Mrs A is honest she sends truthful messages, and since he correctly perceives that
the message of opportunist sellers is not informative, we obtain that Mr Bs posterior belief
that b = 1 is:
post = post + (1  post) Pr(b = 1 j p = p)
where Pr(b = 1 j p = p) = b=. We will also dene the corresponding probability when
the probability that Mrs A is honest coincides with the prior  instead of post. That is,
prior = + (1  ) Pr(b = 1 j p = p):
We have:
Proposition 3 Assume that post >  > prior. Then, the above strategy prole is an
29The latter probability requires that  = o (which has probability 1 ), that p = p (which has probability
), and that the announcement "d = 1, b = 1" is picked (which is perceived to have probability ) while
these three events are all perceived to be independent.
21
analogy-based sequential equilibrium.
Proof: Given that post >  and the above derivations, after observing that p = p and
hearing from Mrs A that d = 1, b = 1, Mr B optimally says "yes" to the o¤er because he
infers that the chance that there is indeed another buyer post is high enough (larger than ).
Clearly, if Mr B is told that there is no other buyer b = 0, he will infer that Mrs A is honest
(because opportunist sellers never say that), and accordingly he will know for sure that there
is no other buyer and will say "no" when the price is p = p. Finally, after observing that
p = p and hearing from Mrs A that d = 0, b = 1, Mr B will believe according to his cognitive
perception that Mrs A is honest with some probability b.30 Because post( = h) >  (as
otherwise one could not have post > prior) and ( = h j p = p, A says d = 0 or 1,
b = 0) = 1, we can infer that b <  (the evolution of  as perceived by Mr B should be a
martingale). Given that prior <  (and that the o¤er when no discount is proposed is worse,
everything else being equal), we conclude that Mr B nds it optimal to reject the o¤er after
observing p = p and hearing from Mrs A that d = 0, b = 1. This also ensures that when Mrs
A is opportunist and p = p, she does not nd it desirable to say that d = 0, b = 1 because
she rightly anticipates that the o¤er would be rejected in such a case. Q. E. D.
D. Discussion
Observe that the condition  > prior is independent of Pr(p = p) whereas post > 
is automatically satised when Pr(p = p) is su¢ciently small.31 Thus, the conditions of
Proposition 3 require that the prior probability  that Mrs A is honest be not too large, so
that  > prior, and that the probability  that p = p be not too large, so that post > . The
e¤ect of Pr(p = p) on the equilibrium analysis is, of course, due to the erroneous inference
process of Mr B, caused by his bundling of the decision nodes of Mrs A into a single analogy
30This b is derived analogously to post and can be expressed as
b = (1  d)b

(1  d)b
 + (1  )(1  )2
31To illustrate this, consider the case in which the probability that p = p is independent of whether b = 0; 1
so that  =  = . Then post( = h) simplies into db
db+(1 )
; which converges to 1 as  approaches
0, thereby implying that post approaches 1 >  when  ' 0.
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class, whether p = p or p. Increasing Pr(p = p) makes the deceptive tactic of Mrs A when
p = p and  = o more e¤ective, as reporting that there are deciencies becomes more
representative of the overall attitude of honest sellers than of opportunist sellers. Ironically,
had we assumed that Mr B were fully rational instead, he should have inferred, when p = p
and Mrs A reports deciencies, that Mrs A is more likely to be an opportunist, since when
p = p mentioning deciencies is more typical of opportunists than of honest sellers. But
Mr B is unaware of how the behaviors of sellers di¤er in situations p = p and p, thereby
explaining his erroneous judgement.
We note that in the equilibrium shown above, when p = p, and Mrs A honestly reports
that d = 0 and b = 1, Mr B does not trust Mrs A and he rejects her o¤er. So we see here
that when Mrs A is opportunist, her deceptive tactic imposes a cost on honest sellers, who
are no longer trusted in some scenarios.
It should also be mentioned that under the conditions of Proposition 3 , we could not
sustain an equilibrium in which opportunist sellers always say that d = 0 and b = 1 irre-
spective of p = p and p. Indeed, if this were so, after hearing that d = 0 and b = 1, Mr B
would believe that he is facing an honest seller with a probability smaller than the prior 
(since saying d = 0 and b = 1 would then be more typical of opportunists than of honest
sellers: - remember that opportunists say d = 0 and b = 1 when p = p). Since  > prior,
Mr B would then reject Mrs As o¤er. By contrast, if Mrs A were to say that d = 1 and
b = 1 when p = p, she would convince Mr B that she is an honest seller with probability 1
and Mr B would then accept Mrs As o¤er, thereby implying that the assumed strategy of
Mrs A when p = p and  = o is not optimal.
In a di¤erent vein, it is also worth noting that if Mr B had not distinguished the di¤erent
categories of sellers (i.e., B = 0), then the deceptive tactic of the opportunist Mrs A would
have been pointless, since Mr B would have kept believing that he is facing an honest seller
with probability  whatever Mrs As announcements, and he would have rejected the deal
when p = p (given that  > prior). Thus, we see that the deceptive tactic of Mrs A requires
that Mr B be not too irrational, in the sense that Mr Bs cognitive type should allow him
to make some inferences from what he observes.
Finally, it is instructive to contrast the insights obtained in our cognitive environment
with those that would arise had we assumed that Mr B were fully rational. An important
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observation is that when Mr B is rational it can never be optimal for Mrs A, when she is
opportunist, to say that d = 1 with probability 1 when p = p. Indeed, if she did so, then Mr
B - assumed to be rational - would infer that Mrs A is an honest seller with a probability
smaller than the prior , and it is not hard to see that this cannot be benecial to Mrs A
(given the extra cost due to the discount imposed by the announcement of d = 1).32 As it
turns out, when  > prior and Mr B is rational, Mrs A, when she is opportunist and p = p,
will mix between announcing d = 0 or 1 and will announce b = 1: Mr Bs posterior belief
that Mrs A is honest after either (p = p and Mrs A says d = 0 and b = 1) or (p = p and
Mrs A says d = 1 and b = 1) must be smaller than  (due to the martingale property of
beliefs), thereby implying that Mr B rejects Mrs As o¤er in one of these two cases. Due
to the required indi¤erence of Mrs A between announcing (d = 0 and b = 1) or announcing
(d = 1 and b = 1) we conclude that Mrs A cannot obtain that a transaction with Mr B takes
place with probability 1 when p = p and  > prior. This is, of course, in sharp contrast
with what happens in the above cognitive environment as analyzed in Proposition 3.
III. Conclusion
What are the lessons to be drawn from our approach? Firstly, a description of the
prototype of a deceptive tactic. In the above bargaining story (as in many real life situations),
the rst stage of the deception involves building a relation of condence with the victim
(even if this has some cost, as illustrated by the announcement of the deciencies in the
bargaining story) so as to better exploit it at a later stage. Thus, from a practical viewpoint,
one is more likely to discover a deceptive tactic when one sees a party making an initial
sacrice that subsequently turns out to be of great benet to this same party. Secondly,
according to our theory, deception requires the presence of agents who are neither fully
rational (otherwise, their beliefs could not be manipulated) nor fully irrational, in the sense
of not distinguishing the various types of the opponent (otherwise, there could be no inference
process as the interaction proceeds). More precisely, our theory of deception requires the
presence of agents who somehow have a stereotypical understanding of others attitudes. Our
32Under the condition of Proposition 3 ( > prior), Mr B would reject Mrs As o¤er. Even if  < prior,
when Mrs A is opportunist she will prefer to say that d = 0 and b = 1 so as to save on the discount .
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theory thus provides some content to the common-sense idea that the best candidates for
belief manipulation and deception are individuals who are neither too smart nor too dumb.
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